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INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental issue facing state and local government is the question of 
how extensively it may regulate private property in the course of executing its 
land use policies and exercising its police power. The issue involves an 
inherent tension between government and its desire to regulate for the health, 
safety and welfare of the community on one hand and the rights of private 
property owners to do with their land as they wish on the other. 
The roots of the dilemma run deep. Many argue that private property 
rights form the very foundation of individual liberty, upon which government 
regulations should not be allowed to intrude. Under this viewpoint, 
individuals must be defended against state interference, I and government must 
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. J.D., M.S. 
University of Wisconsin - Madison; M.B.S. University of Colorado; B.S. Indiana University. 
1. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (\859). 
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not be allowed to force individual property owners to bear a disproportionate 
portion of the costs of particular government policies. 
In contrast, at a certain level, local government's primary purpose is to 
regulate. Most would agree that in a civilized society certain property rights 
must yield to the common good. As noted by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change .... As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied 
limitation and must yield to the police power.,,3 
One of the ways that local government often exercises this so-called 
police power4 is by regulating private property and land use through the 
legislative technique of "zoning." First sanctioned explicitly by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.,5 zoning 
typically sets out areas specifying what sorts of uses and structures will be 
allowed on specific properties. Since Euclid, courts at all levels have 
consistently upheld a wide variety of zoning ordinances despite the damage 
that they can do to the interests of individual property owners.6 
With zoning comes the inevitable problem of what to do with so-called 
"nonconforming" uses and structures-those uses and structures that are not 
permitted in the new use districts in which they are located. On ()ne hand, the 
interests of individual property owners can be affected significantly if such 
preexisting lawful uses and structures become nonconforming and then are 
required to be terminated; on the other hand, "[a] zoning ordinance cannot 
achieve its goal of separating incompatible uses in this situation unless it 
requires the elimination ofnonconforming useS.,,7 In the early days of zoning, 
most ordinances provided that lawful uses existing on the effective date of the 
law could continue, since it was thought "they would be few and likely to be 
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. 
4. "Police power" refers to state government's power to protect public health, safety 
and welfare. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the police power as "not confined ... to the 
suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary. It extends to so dealing with the 
conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people." 
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311,318 (1907). 
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, the Court upheld a local zoning ordinance that set 
zoning boundaries and in so doing decreased the fair market value of plaintiffs land by 75%, 
from approximately $10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. See infra 
note 16 and accompanying text for further discussion of Euclid. 
6. Zoning ordinances often diminish the value - economic and non-economic - of the 
land regulated. See, e.g., supra note 5. Zoning can also increase the value of the land 
regulated, in which case the property owner likely does not complain about the regulation. 
7. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.66 at 205 (3d ed. 1993). 
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eliminated by the passage of time and restrictions on their expansion."g 
Nonconforming uses have not disappeared, however, so new techniques were 
developed to accomplish the "earnest aim and ultimate purpose of zoning 
[which] was and is to reduce nonconformance to conformance as speedily as 
possible with due regard to the legitimate interests of all concerned.,,9 
One technique that local legislatures developed to eliminate 
nonconforming uses, while at the same time taking into account private 
property rights, is the technique of "amortization.,,10 Within the last fifty 
years, courts in a majority of the states have upheld legislatively-enacted 
amortization provisions. Michigan is not among those states. Michigan has 
so far rejected amortization not so much because of any deeply-held 
philosophical reservations, but rather more by accident due to the fact that at 
the time the Michigan legislature set forth its proposed amortization language 
in 1947--only to have it rejected by a now-obsolete Attorney General 
Opinion II-the technique was in its infancy, 12 and had not yet become accepted 
by an overwhelming majority of courts l3 as it has today. 
Section I of this article provides a brief history of zoning and 
nonconforming uses, and demonstrates that local government subunits l4 in 
Michigan do have the authority to legislate to limit and even eliminate 
nonconforming uses under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the Zoning 
Enabling Act's prohibition against amortization of nonconforming uses. This 
authority does not, however, give cities sufficient discretion to carry out 
adequately their police power responsibilities. Section II argues that to 
remedy this deficiency, the Michigan legislature should amend the state 
Zoning Enabling Act to allow the amortization of nonconforming uses when 
all other efforts to reconcile the private and public interests have failed. Such 
8. Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (Md. Ct. App. 
1957). 
9. Grant, 129 A.2d at 365. 
10. The term amortization refers to the gradual "phasing-out" or elimination of 
nonconforming uses and structures over a specified period oftime. See 83 AM. JUR. 20 Zoning 
and Planning § 691 (1992). 
II. See infra notes 94, 100-108 and accompanying text. 
12. "While amortization was upheld as early as 1929 it did not enjoy substantial 
utilization until the 1950s and 1960s." DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD 
JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LA W § 4.35 at 123 (2d 
ed. 1986) (footnote omitted). 
13. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 
244 (4th ed. 1995). 
14. Local government subunits include, among others, cities, villages, townships, 
counties, and districts. For purposes of consistency, this article will refer to these local 
government subunits as a whole by the generic term of "city". 
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an amendment would go a long way toward creating a Zoning Enabling Act 
that provides "clear and uniform laws adapted to modem needs"-a standard 
that the research arm of the Michigan House of Representatives has 
advocated. IS Section III concludes by restating the Article's main points and 
emphasizing the importance, from a policy standpoint, of the Michigan 
legislature taking cognizance of the need for an amendment to allow 
amortization of nonconforming uses and structures. 
I. EXISTING MICHIGAN LAW ALLOWS THE REASONED EXCLUSION OR 
ELIMINATION OF NONCONFORMING USES UNDER CERTAIN SPECIFIC 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. HistorylBackground 
To put the issue of amortization in the proper context, it is useful to 
discuss briefly the history of zoning and nonconforming uses in the United 
States and Michigan. After the U.S. Supreme Court first upheld a city's right 
to zone in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.,16 zoning ordinances 
proliferated: between the years of 1930 and 1967 the number of cities that had 
zoning ordinances increased from 1,000 to over 9,000. 17 Zoning is essentially 
a police power exercise that resides in the state, which then delegates the 
power to local governments through the mechanism of the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act.IS The validity of a particular Michigan zoning 
15. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, SECOND ANALYSIS, H.B.s 4591-4594 
(Mich. 1979) at 3. See also infra note 112 and accompanying text. According to the Analysis, 
the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act as it now stands is "severely outdated and [is] in many 
places vague and confusing. Changing trends in the planning and use ofland ... have rendered 
these statutes unwieldy and inadequate tools." Id. at 1. See infra note Ill. 
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, the city's zoning plan separated the city into 
various use districts, height districts, and area districts, and in so doing diminished the value of 
the plaintiff's land by 75%, from $10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre. The Court upheld the 
city's zoning ordinance, finding that it did not result in a taking violation tinder the Fifth or 
Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. The court stated that zoning will be 
presumed valid, overturned only upon a showing by plaintiff that the zoning is "clearly arbitrary 
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare." Id. at 395. 
17. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1003 (3d ed. 1993). In the words 
of one commentator, "Zoning reached puberty in company with the Stutz Bearcat and the 
speakeasy. F. Scott Fitzgerald and the Lindy Hop were products of the same generation. Of all 
these phenomena of the twenties, only local zoning has remained viable a generation later." 
RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 3 (1966). 
18. MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 13, at 197-201. Every state has adopted the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act in one form or another. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 
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ordinance is determined by whether it meets the legal test of "reasonableness": 
"It is firmly established that zoning ordinances, when related to the public 
health, morals, safety or general welfare, are a valid exercise of the police 
power, provided that such ordinances satisfy the legal test of 
reasonableness.,,19 
Once a zoning ordinance is in place, it is highly likely that some 
preexisting uses and structures are not permitted in the newly zoned area in 
which they are located. Courts around the country have adopted different 
approaches in addressing the often-diametrically opposed interests at stake in 
the matter of such nonconforming uses and structures. It is generally agreed 
that a measure forcing the immediate cessation of a nonconforming use is not 
allowed, on the grounds that such an action would constitute a "taking" of 
property without just compensation20 in violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
17, at 1005. Michigan's zoning enabling act for cities and villages is contained in MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. §§ 125.581-.600 (West 1989). The enabling statutes for townships is contained in 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 125.271-.310 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) and for counties in 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 125.200-.241 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). 
19. Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom, 382 Mich. 673, 686,172 N.W.2d 382,387 
(1969) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring) (citing, e.g., Roll v. City ofTroy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 
804 (1963); West Bloomfield Township v. Chapman, 351 Mich. 606, 88 N.W.2d 377 (1958». 
One factor that Michigan courts have identified as important in determining "reasonableness" 
is whether the regulation allows for alternate uses of the property. See, e.g., Recreational 
Vehicle v. Sterling Heights, 165 Mich. App. 130,418 N. W.2d 702 (1987)(upholding ordinance 
limiting recreational vehicle parking on private property where regulation permitted reasonable 
alternate uses for the property); Fenton Gravel Co. v. Village of Fenton, 371 Mich. 358, 123 
N.W.2d 763 (1963) (holding that a regulation will not on its face be considered a taking of 
property in violation ofthe State and Federal Constitutions so long as the regulation allows for 
alternate uses of the property.) Regarding the reasonableness test, "[i]t is equally well 
established that each case involving the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance and its consequent 
validity or invalidity must be determined on its own facts and surrounding circumstances." 
Detroit Edison Co., 382 Mich. at 686-87, 172 N.W.2d at 387 (citing, e.g., Korby v. Redford 
Township, 348 Mich. 193,82 N.W.2d 441 (1957); Long v. City of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 
146,45 N.W.2d \0 (1950». 
20. MANDELKER, supra note 7 at 206 (citing Jones v. City of Los Angeks, 295 P. 14 
(Cal. 1930); Missouri Rock, Inc. v. Winholtz, 614 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
Historically, an important exception to this principle is the case where the nonconforming 
use or structure constitutes what the legislature says is a nuisance, in which case the 
nonconforming use can be terminated immediately without compensation to the owner. See, 
e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
Within the last decade, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a needed limitation on the 
extent to which cities may restrict property rights on "nuisance" grounds. See Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a regulation denying all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land is to be presumed unconstitutional per se-a 
presumption rebuttable only upon a showing by the regulating authority that "background 
principles of nuisance and property law ... prohibit the [owner's intended] uses") Lucas, 505 
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the U.S. Constitution.21 Accordingly, from the beginning, almost every 
zoning ordinance required that nonconforming uses be allowed to continue.22 
In the words of one court: 
Originally [nonconforming uses] were not regarded as serious handicaps to [zoning's] 
effective operation; it was felt they would be few and likely to be eliminated by the 
passage of time and restrictions on their expansion. For these reasons and because 
it was thought that to require immediate cessation would be harsh and unreasonable, 
a deprivation of rights in property out of proportion to the public benefits to be 
obtained and, so, unconstitutional ... at a time when strong opposition might have 
jeopardized the chance of any zoning, most, if not all, zoning ordinances provided 
that lawful uses existing on the effective date ofthe law could continue although such 
uses could not thereafter be begun.23 
An alternative approach, favored now by an overwhelming majority of 
the courts,24 allows amortization, the "gradual elimination of nonconforming 
uses to accomplish the zoning objective of compatible and homogenous land 
use environments.,,25 Under the amortization approach, the city undertakes to 
u.s. at 1031. After Lucas, if a regulation intended to control a nuisance causes a total 
"wipeout" to the value of the property, the regulation will be presumed to be an unconstitutional 
"taking," prohibited under the Fifth Amendment. lithe nuisance-control regulation causes less 
than a total wipeout, however, the principle espoused in Hadacheck and Miller still controls, 
whereby no taking occurs and the government may so regulate without paying just 
compensation. 
21. The Fifth Amendment's "takings" clause states, "nor shall private property be taken 
for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Correspondingly, the 
Michigan Constitution provides, "private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. 
Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record." MICH. CONST. art 10, 
§ 2. 
22. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 12, § 4.27, at 114; MANDELKER, supra 
note 7. 
23. Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 129 A.2d 363,365 (Md. Ct. App. 
1957). At the core of the reluctance to allow amortization is the concern that the property 
owner's "expectation" interests would be unlawfully abridged if amortization were allowed. 
When a person purchases real property, he or she expects to be able to use all the "sticks" in the 
bundle of rights that is the property in a way allowed under the zoning regulations in place at 
the time of purchase. If one of those sticks is altered after the purchase-say, the right to 
continue operating a scrapyard in a newly-zoned residential area-the scrapyard owner's 
expectation of running a scrapyard on the property for as long as he desires is compromised. 
Similarly, that person's expectation of being able to sell the property for a price reflecting the 
market value of a scrapyard would be altered (although not necessarily always to the property 
owner's detriment-it is entirely possible tbat property values would increase as a result of such 
a zoning change). 
24. MANDELKER, ET AL., supra note 13; MANDELKER, supra note 7, § 5.72, at 213 
(citing cases from many states). 
25. MANDELKER, supra note 7. Most amortization statutes hold to the principle that 
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establ ish a reasonable period of time that is intended to allow the property 
owner to "recoup" at least a significant part of his investment-i.e., to satisfy 
his expectation interest.26 After the time elapses the nonconforming use will 
terminate.27 
The jurisdictions upholding amortization as facially valid have developed 
a set of factors to be utilized in the determination of whether, as applied, the 
scheme is reasonable. Generally, local regulations providing for the eventual 
termination or substitution of non-conforming uses without compensation are 
the immediate termination of nonconforming uses is rarely allowed. 
26. See supra note 23. 
27. The length of this so-called "amortization" period can vary: 
Nonconforming uses of land are typically given the shortest period, since there is no 
investment in buildings and ... the activities can assumedly locate elsewhere with a 
minimum of loss. Since the building could assumedly be used for conforming uses, 
relatively short periods of amortization also might be provided for nonconforming 
uses of conforming buildings. The periods are typically longest for nonconforming 
buildings, particularly those that are specialties, such as an oil refinery which would 
have a large capital investment and buildings that would be rather difficult to utilize 
for a conforming purpose. The period of amortization may also depend on the type 
of construction, so that the period would be longer for brick or concrete high-rise 
buildings and less for temporary, low-rise, inexpensively constructed warehouses. 
HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 12, § 4.35, at 122-23. A number of other 
commentators have offered various approaches for determining the proper amortization period 
in any given case. See. e.g .. Gilbert T. Graham, Legislative Techniques for the Amortization of 
the Nonconforming Use: A Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 435 (1966); David R. 
Schwiesow, A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for 
Nonconforming Structures. 27 STAN. L. REv. 1325(1975). A useful statement of the 
reasonableness of amortization periods in different circumstances is contained in the following 
statement by the highest New York court: 
Whether an amortization period is reasonable is a question which must be answered 
in the light of the facts of each particular case. Certainly, a critical factor to be 
considered is the length of the amortization period in relation to the investment .... 
Similarly, another factor considered significant by some courts is the nature of the 
nonconforming activity prohibited. Generally a shorter amortization period may be 
provided for a nonconforming use as opposed to a nonconforming structure .... 
[T]he critical question [,however,] is whether the public gain achieved by the exercise 
of the police power outweighs the private loss suffered by the owners of 
nonconforming uses. While an owner need not be given that period oftime necessary 
to permit him to recoup his investment entirely, the amortization period should not 
be so short as to result in a substantial loss of his investment .... In determining what 
constitutes a substantial loss, a court ... should look to, for example, such factors as: 
initial capital investment, investment realization to date, life expectancy of the 
investment, [and] the existence or nonexistence of a lease obligation, as well as a 
contingency clause permitting termination of the lease. 
Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 262 (N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed. 439 
U.S. 809 (1978) (citations omitted). 
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found reasonable-and hence constitutionaP8-where the court considers 
relevant facts and circumstances such as the nature of the property's current 
use, in its development prospects, as well as the length of the proposed period 
of amortization, and determines that the benefits to the community exceed the 
detriment to the private owner.29 
An influential 1954 California state court case illustrates well the 
analysis undertaken by courts when considering the validity of a particular 
amortization provision. In City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 30 the California Court 
of Appeals upheld a local ordinance that imposed a five-year amortization 
period on a plumbing supply business conducted in a residential dwelling. In 
balancing the interests at stake, the court reasoned that the noise, disturbance 
and traffic caused by Gage's operation was high for a residential 
neighborhood;31 thattermination after normal useful remaining life is proper;32 
that the property could be used for a conforming use;33 and that uses such as 
Gage's tend to impair the development and stability of the comprehensive 
plan.34 The court concluded that the gradual elimination of nonconforming 
uses was a logical and reasonable method for assuring the character of 
residential areas, and opined that there was no distinction between 
amortization and other methods for eliminating nonconforming uses, such as 
abandonment or restoration provisions: 
The distinction between an ordinance restricting future uses and one requiring the 
termination of present uses within a reasonable period of time is merely one of degree, 
and constitutionality depends on the relative importance to be given to the public gain 
and to the private loss [and that the amortization provisions were no harsher than 
ordinances preventing extension, alteration and reuse after abandonment] .... Use 
of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means of reconciliation of 
the. conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process requirements. 3; 
28. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
29. See. e.g .. Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Ebel v. Corona, 767 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1985); Art Neon Co. 
v. Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (\ Oth Cir. 1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 932 (1974); SDJ, Inc. v. City 
of Houston, 636 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Tex. 1986). See also generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 8 A.L.R. 5th 391, § 3 (1993). 
30. 274 P.2d 34 (Cal. App. 1954). 
31. Gage. 274 P.2d at 37. 
32. See id. at 44. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. ld. See also. e.g .. Art Neon Co., 488 F.2d 118; Donrey Communications Co. v. City 
of Fayetteville, 660 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1983), cert. denied. 466 U.S. 959 (1984); Metromedia, 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds. 453 U.S. 490 
(1981); Mayor & Council v. Rollings Outdoor Adver., Inc., 475 A.2d 355 (Del. 1984); Lamar 
Adver. Assoc. of E. Fla. v. City of Daytona Beach, 450 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
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Despite the momentum created by Gage and these other cases,36 however, 
a minority of state legislatures and courts (including Michigan's) continue to 
forbid the scheduled termination of nonconforming uses or structures under 
any circumstances. Under this minority approach, "primary emphasis [is 
placed] on protecting the 'vested' rights[37] of property owners in 
nonconforming uses. Courts adopting this philosophy tend to strike down 
zoning requirements that eliminate nonconforming uses," period--even ifthe 
elimination takes place only after an extended period oftime.38 
B. The Statute 
As noted, Michigan's Zoning Enabling Act explicitly limits a city's 
ability to terminate nonconforming uses and structures. In its entirety, section 
125.583a of the Zoning Enabling Act states: 
Sec. 3a. (I) The lawful use of land or a structure exactly as the land or structure 
existed at the time of the enactment of the ordinance affecting that land or structure, 
may be continued, except as otherwise provided in this act, although that use or 
structure does not conform with the ordinance. 
(2) The legislative body may provide by ordinance for the resumption, 
restoration, reconstruction, extension, or substitution of nonconforming uses or 
structures upon terms and conditions provided in the ordinance. In establishing terms 
for the resumption, restoration, reconstruction, extension, or substitution of 
Village of Glenview v. Velasquez, 463 N.E.2d 873 (III. App. Ct. 1984); Spurgeon v. Board of 
Comm'r of Shawnee Co., 317 P.2d 798 (Kan. 1957); Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Village 
of Minnetonka, 162 N. W.2d 206 (Minn. 1968); University City v. Diveley Auto Body Co., 417 
S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1967); Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 
(N.M. 1982); Modjeska Sign Studios. Inc., 373 N.E.2d 255; Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. City of 
Raleigh, 306 S.E.2d 192 (N.c. App. 1983); Sullivan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 478 A.2d 
912 (Pa. Comm. 1984); Fairway Food, Inc. v. Timmer, 314 S.E.2d 322 (S.c. 1984); Rives v. 
City of Clarksville, 618 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn. App. 1981); City of Seattle v. Martin, 342 P.2d 602 
(Wash. 1959); 22 A.L.R.3d 1134 (1969). 
36. See supra note 35. 
37. In order to be protected, nonconforming uses "must be lawfully established at the 
time the ordinance making them nonconforming takes effect .... A lawful use is not usually 
established by [mere] intent or plans, even if the intent has been perfected by purchasing land, 
arranging for finance, entering into contracts, clearing the land and so forth. The use must be 
more substantial." HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 12, § 4.28, at 116 (citing Fredal 
v. Forster, 9 Mich. App. 215, 156 N.W.2d 606 (1967) (removal of50,000 cubic yards of stone 
held to be substantial enough to establish quarry use (footnotes omitted»). If a landowner has 
been granted a permit to put the property to a specified use which then becomes nonconforming 
due to a zoning change, courts will usually allow the city to revoke the permit "unless [good 
faith] expenditures have been made in reliance on the permit." HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, 
supra note 12, § 5.11 at 155. 
38. MANDELKER, supra note 7, § 5.66, at 206. 
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nonconfonning uses or structures, different classes of nonconfonning use may be 
established in the ordinance with different regulations applicable to each class. 
(3) In addition to the power granted in this section, a city or village may acquire 
by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise private property or an interest in private 
property for the removal of nonconforming uses and structures, except that the 
property shall not be used for public housing.39 
According to Section 3a(3),40 the only way a city may eliminate a 
nonconforming use or structure is by acquiring the property or an interest in 
the property by purchase or condemnation. This limitation is qualified by a 
major caveat, however: under section 3a(2), the city may specify by ordinance 
the terms and conditions under which a nonconforming use or structure may 
be "resumed" "restored" "reconstructed" "extended" or "substituted ,,41 In , , , , . 
interpreting this provision, it is important to note that each of these five terms 
involve some sort of change to the nonconforming use. By its terms, the 
statute does not allow the city to set terms and conditions for a nonconforming 
use where there is no change contemplated. 
As far as it goes, though, the city's power to set terms and conditions 
under Section 3a(2) is broad. In requiring that legislative provisions must be 
liberally and broadly construed in favor of cities, the Michigan Constitution 
states, "[t]he provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties, 
townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor. 
Powers granted to counties and townships by this constitution and by law shall 
include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this constitution.,,42 
Accordingly, the Michigan Supreme Court recently confirmed that "[t]he 
enactment and enforcement of ordinances related to municipal concerns is a 
valid exercise of municipal police powers as long as the ordinance does not 
conflict with the constitution or general laws.,,43 In Square Lake Hills 
39. See MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. 125.583a (West 1997). This statute governs cities 
and villages. A parallel, virtually identical statute governs counties and townships. This 
article's arguments apply equally to both statutes. 
40. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
41. SeeMICH.COMP.LAWSANN.125.583a§3a(2)(West 1997). See supra note 39 and 
accompanying text. Section 3a(2) further provides that the city may establish different classes 
of nonconfonning uses and structures with different regulations applicable to each class. See 
id. 
42. MICH. CaNST. art. 7, § 34. 
43. Rental Property Owners Ass'n of Kent County v. City of Grand Rapids, 455 Mich. 
246,253,566 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1997) (citing Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 674, 278 N.W. 
727,730 (1938); Fass v. Highland Park, on reh'g, 321 Mich. 156, 161,32 N.W.2d 375, 377 
(1948); Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939». The court also commented in 
another recent case that "the police power 'belongs to subordinate governmental divisions when 
and as conferred by the State either through its Constitution or constitutionally authorized 
legislation.'" Adams Outdoor Adver. v. East Lansing, 439 Mich. 209, 225, 483 N. W.2d 38, 45 
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Condominium Ass 'no V. Bloomfield Township,44 for example, the Michigan 
Supreme Court noted that any judicial analysis of powers expressly and 
explicitly conferred upon municipalities will be conducted in such a manner 
as to give broad deference to the municipality.45 
How is a municipality to know, then, how to interpret the terms of 
Section 12S.S83a(2)? Taking Section 3a(2) one term at a time, "resumption" 
of a nonconforming use refers to the case where the use has been abandoned 
or otherwise discontinued. Under general common law principles, when the 
nonconforming use or structure has been abandoned, the nonconforming use 
lapses, and the owner is not allowed to resume the use.46 Michigan courts 
have held that the necessary elements of abandonment in this context are 
intent and some act or omission on the part of the owner or holder which 
clearly manifests his or her voluntary decision to abandon.47 
"Reconstruction" and "restoration" refer to the case where the 
nonconforming use or structure has been somehow damaged or destroyed. 
Under common law principles, once the use or structure is damaged or 
destroyed, by fire for example, most courts will typically permit repairs to be 
(1992) (Levin, J., concurring in disposition, dissenting in part) (qouting Clements V. McCabe, 
210 Mich. 207, 215, 177N.W. 722, 725 (1920). See also City of Livonia V. D.S.S., 423 Mich. 
466,492-94,378 N.W.2d 402, 415-16 (1985) (discussing continued vitality of Clements); 
Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. v. Southfield, 377 Mich. 128, 132, 139 N.W.2d 728, 729-30 (1966); 
Krajenke Buick Sales v. Hamtramck City Engineer, 322 Mich. 250,254,33 N.W.2d 781,782 
(1948); Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 265,175 N.W. 480, 483 (1919». 
44. 437 Mich. 310, 471 N.W.2d 321, reh'gdenied, 472 N.W.2d 287 (1991). 
45. Square Lake, 437 Mich. at 317, 471 N.W.2d at 324. The Michigan Court of 
Appeals put it well in Horton v. Kalamazoo, 81 Mich. App. 78, 81, 264 N.W.2d 128, 129 
(1978): 
The actions of a municipal legislative body enjoy a presumption of validity. The 
courts are especially deferential toward legislative determinations of public purpose, 
"[t]or determination of what constitutes a public purpose involves considerations of 
economic and social philosophies and principles of political science and government. 
Such determinations should be made by the elected representatives of the people." 
ld. (citations omitted). 
See also Inch Memorials v. City of Pontiac, 93 Mich. App. 532, 535, 286 N. W.2d 903, 904 
(1979) (stating that "the powers that cities possess fall into three categories: those granted in 
express words; those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; 
and those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the municipal 
corporation") (citations omitted); 1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 353, 369; 
20 N. W.2d 217, 223 (1945); Law Enforcement Union v. Highland Park, 138 Mich. App. 342, 
346; 360 N.W.2d 611, 613, rev'd, 422 Mich. 945, 374 N.W.2d 698 (1984); Youngblood v. 
Jackson County, 28 Mich. App. 361, 365; 184 N.W.2d 290, 291 (1970). 
46. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 7, § 5.69, at 209-10; HAGMAN & 
JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 12, § 4.33 at 120-21. 
47. Norton Shores v. Carr, 81 Mich. App. 715, 265 N.W.2d 802 (1978). 
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made.48 Alterations, however, are usually precIuded,49 so the issue becomes 
one of where the distinction between "repair" and "alteration" lies. 
"Substitution" refers to the act of replacing one structure with another 
structure, as in Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 50 or the actual substitution of one 
use for another. In Kopietz v. Zoning Board of Appeals for the City of the 
Village of Clarkston, 51 for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals overturned 
a local zoning board's refusal to permit a change in the nonconforming use of 
a property from a funeral home to a bed-and-breakfast-a significant change 
indeed. The court held that "[a]n ordinance requiring an immediate cessation 
of a nonconforming use may be held to be unconstitutional because it brings 
about a deprivation of property rights out of proportion to the public benefit 
obtained.,,52 The court explained that "not every change in a nonconforming 
use constitutes an extension of a prior nonconforming use" and commented 
that "when the proposed use does not expand or extend the nonconformity, the 
property owner [may] continue the nonconforming use.,,53 
The term "extension" is more ambiguous-and potentially more 
broad-than the other four terms. 54 In the zoning context, "extension" normally 
refers to the physical alteration of the nonconforming use to allow a larger 
structure or an additional piece of property. 55 Under common law principles, 
48. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 12, § 4.30, at 118. "Such permission 
makes sense, because there is a general policy, particularly as represented by housing codes, to 
have buildings in a good state of repair." Id. It should be emphasized that the local ordinances 
may specify the terms for reconstruction and restoration, as allowed by Section 3a(2), and the 
courts have upheld such restrictions against constitutional attacks. See MAJ>.'DELKER, supra note 
7, § 5.68, at 208. This principle was explained in an early Michigan Law Review article 
emphasizing that a zoning ordinance may prohibit the repair of nonconforming existing 
structures. William F. Fratcher, Comment, Constitutional Law-Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting 
Repair oj Existing Structure, 35 MICH. L. REv. 642 (1937). 
49. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 12, § 4.30, at 119. 
50. 298 Mich. 98, 298 N.W. 466 (1941) (upholding city's refusal to allow substitution 
of nonconforming structure with newer altered structure, even though newer structure would 
actually decrease the amount of square feet used for the nonconforming use). 
51. 211 Mich. App. 666, 535 N.W.2d 910 (1995). 
52. Kopietz, 211 Mich. App. at 694 (quoting Austin, 283 Mich. at 676). 
53. [d. at 696. 
54. Black's Law Dictionary notes that the term "extend" "lends itself to great variety 
of meanings, which must in each case be gathered from context. It may mean to expand, 
enlarge, prolong, lengthen, widen, carry or draw out further than the original limit." BLACK'S 
LA W DICTIONARY 583 (6th ed. 1990). 
55. An alternative interpretation of "extension" might mean, however, the actual 
"passing of the right" to continue the nonconforming use from the owner to subsequent owners. 
This would be the "prolong, lengthen, ... carry or draw out further than the original limit" part 
of the Black's description described supra, note 54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 583 (6th ed. 
1990). 
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a nonconforming use cannot be changed or expanded. In Township of White 
Lake v. Lustig, 56 the Michigan Court of Appeals carefully examined Michigan 
precedent and concluded that 
it is the law of Michigan that the continuation of a nonconforming use must be 
substantially of the same size and same essential nature as the use existing at the time 
of passage of a valid zoning ordinance and that the use must be within the same 
spatial confines that the prior use occupied. 57 
In giving a city the power to enact legislation to set terms and conditions 
for the "resumption," "restoration," "reconstruction," "extension," or 
"substitution" of nonconforming uses and structures, MCLA § 125 .583a more 
pointedly gives a city the power to determine when not to allow these 
activities. This latter "negative" power is the "exclusion" or "elimination" of 
nonconforming uses of which the Michigan Supreme Court spoke when it 
stated that a 
provision of a zoning ordinance permitting the continuation of a nonconforming use 
is designed to avoid the imposition of hardship upon the owner of property, but the 
limitation upon such use contemplates the gradual elimination of the nonconforming 
use and does not permit the erection of new nonconforming buildings or additions to 
existing nonconforming buildings58 
Such an interpretation would be used, for example, as follows: "The nonconforming use 
was extended from Mr. A to Ms. B upon the sale of the property from A to B." The viability 
of this alternative interpretation is uncertain-no Michigan court has addressed the matter, and 
the legislative history does not provide details on how the term should be interpreted. 
56. 10 Mich. App. 665,160 N.W.2d 353 (1968). 
57. White Lake. 10 Mich. App. at 673-74, 160N.W.2dat357. See also Austin, 283 
Mich. at 678, 278 N. W. at 731 (stating that "[l]irniting the further extension ofa nonconforming 
use by prohibiting alterations and additions to existing buildings is a valid exercise of 
governmental power"); Norton Shores v. Carr, 81 Mich. App. 715,720,265 N.W.2d 802,805 
(1978); (commenting that "[t]he policy of the law is against the extension or enlargement of 
nonconforming uses, and zoning regulations should be strictly construed with respect to 
expansion"); Township of Commerce v. Rayberg, 5 Mich. App. 554,557, 147N.W.2d 453, 455 
(1967) (holding that a "nonconforming use is restricted to the area that was nonconforming at 
the time the ordinance was enacted"). 
58. South Central Imp. Ass'n v. City of St. Clair Shores, 348 Mich. 153, 158, 82 
N.W.2d 453, 456 (1957) (emphasis added). See also Cole, 298 Mich. at 104,298 N.W. at 468 
(holding, in a pre-§ 125.583a case, that "limitations upon [nonconforming uses] contemplate 
the gradual elimination ofthe nonconforming use"); Redford Moving & Storage Co. v. City of 
Detroit, 336 Mich.702, 711,58 N.W.2d 812, 815 (I 953)("continuation of a non conforming use 
under the zoning ordinance is for purpose of avoiding imposition of hardship upon the owner 
of the property with a view to the gradual elimination of such nonconforming use"). See also 
infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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or when it has commented that "[t]he improvement of residential districts by 
the exclusion of nonconforming businesses has a reasonable relationship to the 
public health, welfare and safety.,,59 
C. The Current Michigan Zoning Enabling Act Hampers City Efforts to 
Create Compatible Land Use Environments 
Despite the breadth of discretion given cities in MCLA § 125.5 83a(2) to 
set terms and conditions for the resumption, restoration, reconstruction, 
extension, and substitution of nonconforming uses,60 and despite strong 
language from the courts that cities may "exclude" nonconforming uses under 
terms allowed in section 3a(2),61 Michigan cities remain seriously hampered 
in their efforts to carry out adequately their police power responsibilities due 
to their lack of authority to amortize nonconforming uses. The non-
amortization statute, MCLA § 125.583a, unquestionably has the effect of 
protecting the interests of individual property owners, and hence is 
presumptively a good statute. Government at all levels is all too apt to chip 
away at individual rights, so any legislation that provides greater protection 
to the individual property owner is to be applauded, and should be altered only 
after very careful consideration. The Michigan non-amortization statute goes 
too far, however, in failing to allow amortization under any circumstances, 
and to place an outright prohibition on amortization. As a result, the statute 
fails to account for the community's interest in planning for the maximum 
benefit of the greatest number of people. It is axiomatic in a modem, complex 
society that the interests of the individual must be balanced in some way with 
the interests of the community,62 a balancing which by its terms requires that 
the interests of both sides must be compromised to some degree. As pointed 
out by the California court in Gage, nonconforming uses "tend to impair the 
development and stability of the [comprehensive plan] .... Use of a 
reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means of reconciliation 
of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process requirements.,,63 
59. Northwood Properties Co. v. Perkins, 325 Mich. 419, 422, 39 N.W.2d 25, 26 
(1949) (emphasis added) (quoting Austin, 283 Mich. at 678). It is relevant that the Northwood 
Properties, South Central Imp. Ass 'n, and Redford Moving decisions, see supra note 58, 
occurred after the 1947 enactment ofMCLA § 125.583a, indicating that the Michigan Supreme 
Court considered the terms "resumption, restoration, reconstruction, extension [and] 
substitution" in the statute to be consistent with the reasoned "exclusion" or "elimination" of 
nonconforming uses. 
60. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
62. See supra, notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
63. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 43-44 (Cal. App. 2d 1954). See supra 
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To illustrate how a Michigan city has inadequate means under the current 
statute to carry out its police power responsibilities, and how the current 
statute adds a large measure of uncertainty to city planning efforts, imagine 
the following facts. A Michigan Home Rule City,64 the home of a large 
university, has a zoning ordinance that divides the residential areas of the city 
into three districts.65 The ordinance allows for the rental of single-family 
dwellings (in any of the three districts) to up to four unrelated individuals 
upon the granting of a rental I icense. Over a period of years, owners of a large 
percentage of the single-family homes in certain neighborhoods near the 
university acquire rental licenses and now regularly rent the homes to four 
unrelated persons. These neighborhoods become noisier, the homes become 
less-well maintained, families move out, school enrollments in the city drop, 
and the city loses a significant part of its tax base. Seeking to stem the 
conversion of single-family homes to rental units, the city passes an ordinance 
that reduces the number of unrelated tenants allowed in single-family homes 
in any of the three districts from four to twO.66 Thereafter, seeking to cause 
an eventual reduction of the number of single-family homes already licensed 
notes 30-35 and accompanying text. Any amortization provision enacted by the Michigan 
legislature would need to satisfy the legal test of reasonableness, including the requirement that 
there exist reasonable "alternate uses" of the property. See supra note 19. 
64. The Home Rule Cities Act, Public Act 1909, No. 279 (1909) (codified as amended 
at MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 117.1-.38 (West 1991)), "is intended to give cities a large 
measure of home rule. It grants general rights and powers subject to enumerated restrictions." 
Rental Property Owners Ass'n of Kent County v. City of Grand Rapids, 455 Mich. 246, 254, 
566 N.W.2d 514, 518 (I 997)(citing Detroit v. Walker, 445 Mich. 682, 690, 520 N. W.2d 135 
(1994); Conroy v. Battle Creek, 314 Mich. 210,221,22 N.W.2d 275, 298 (1946)). Under 
Article 7, Section 22 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, home rule cities have broad powers 
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community: 
Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances 
relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the 
constitution and law. No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this 
constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this 
section. 
MICH. CONST. art. 7, §22. 
65. The "R-I" district allows single-family dwellings only, with a minimum lot size of 
10,000 square feet; the "R-2" district allows single-family dwellings only, with a minimum lot 
size of 5,000 square feet; the "R-3" district allows single-family or multifamily dwellings. 
66. The point of reducing the number of tenants allowed from four to two is at least 
twofold: one, there will be less economic incentive for the owner to rent the property, thus 
creating an environment more favorable to owner-occupied housing; and two, the lessened 
density itself will improve conditions in the neighborhood. 
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for rental to four unrelated persons,67 the city amends its zoning code to add 
the following provision: 
Any owner (Owner One) of a single-family dwelling licensed for rental to a maximum 
of four unrelated individuals on the effective date of the ordinance may continue to 
maintain that license (assuming all fees are paid and other requirements continue to 
be met) for so long as there is no change in ownership. Upon the first change of 
ownership after the effective date of the ordinance, the new owner (Owner Two) may 
continue to rent the dwelling to a maximum of four unrelated individuals for so long 
as Owner Two continues to own the property. Upon any subsequent change of 
ownership after the effective date of the ordinance, the new owner (Owner Three) 
may rent the dwelling to a maximum of two unrelated individuals, in accordance with 
the provisions of the effective date of the ordinance.68 
In essence, then, the city's amended zoning code allows the current owner, 
and any person to whom the current owner sells the property, to rent to four 
unrelated persons for an unlimited number of years; but any owner thereafter 
could rent to only two unrelated individuals. 
This fact pattern raises two major issues: One, is the ordinance that 
reduces the maximum number of tenants from four to two unconstitutionally 
discriminatory or exclusionary? Two, may the preexisting (now 
nonconforming) rental units legitimately be phased-out in the manner 
contemplated by the city? 
The second major issue raises the more difficult questions; it is therefore 
addressed first. The city can credibly argue that the amendment eliminating 
the nonconforming use upon the second transfer of ownership satisfies the 
legal test of reasonableness, and would thus be upheld by Michigan courtS.69 
The city has a clear incentive under its police power to attempt to protect its 
housing stock and to create safe, attractive neighborhoods. The relative 
hardship to the property owner is low, for the following reasons. First, it is 
worth remembering what the city is in fact doing when it is eliminating these 
nonconforming uses. The city is not prohibiting the rental of these 
dwellings-it is merely reducing the number of tenants allowed in anyone 
single-family dwelling. The property clearly can continue to be put to a 
productive use either as a rental or owner-occupied dwelling, thus satisfying 
the "alternate use" element of the reasonableness test. Second, Owner One is 
able to continue the nonconforming use as long as he desires-there is no set 
time period for elimination of the sort struck down by the Michigan Supreme 
67. After passage of the ordinance, those homes licensed for rental to four unrelated 
individuals have become, by definition, nonconforming uses. 
68. See supra notes 62-63. 
69. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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Court in DeMull v. City of Lowell. 70 Indeed, the amendment not only allows 
Owner One to continue the nonconforming use as long as he desires, but 
allows him to convey the nonconforming use to Owner Two, who may then 
continue to use the nonconforming use as long as she desires. The 
nonconforming use is only eliminated when Owner Two-who received the 
property with notice of the amendment that reduced the maximum number of 
tenants to two-conveys the property to Owner Three. All of these facts 
combined lead to the conclusion that this approach is eminently reasonable, 
taking into account and balancing the needs of both the city and the private 
property owner. 
The city can argue that it takes this gradual approach-rather than 
requiring Owner Two to comply immediately with the new ordinance71-out 
of recognition that Owner One of such a nonconforming uses has developed 
an "expectation" interest, or a "vested right" of sorts, to be able to rent the 
dwelling to four unrelated people.72 On this reasoning, Owner One should be 
allowed to continue that use as long as he desires, and should also be able to 
realize his expectation of being able to enjoy any economic or other advantage 
of conveying the property to the new owner with all of its attendant uses 
intact, including the right to rent to four unrelated people. 73 
On the other hand, there is no getting around the fact that by its action the 
city is attempting to force the eventual discontinuance of a nonconforming 
use, even though there has been no "change" to the use of the sort embodied 
by the language of section 3a(2) of the statute.74 The statute is explicit in 
stating that "[t]he lawful use of land or a structure exactly as the land or 
structure existed at the time ofthe enactment ... may be continued. ,,75 Under 
these facts, because the owners of such nonconforming uses are seeking 
merely to continue the use "exactly as [it] existed at the time of the 
70. 368 Mich. 242, 118 N. W.2d 232 (1962). See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
71. The city might attempt to argue that it could technically refuse to "extend" the 
nonconforming use to Owner Two under Section I 25.583a(2) of the Zoning Enabling Act, see 
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text, but in light of the adverse effect of such a provision 
on the rights of Owner One, it is unlikely that the provision would withstand the legal test of 
reasonableness. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the city would be wise 
to adopt the more gradual approach. 
72. See supra notes 23,37 and accompanying text. 
73. Clearly, the fact that Owner Two will not be able to convey the property to Owner 
Three with the right to rent to a maximum offour unrelated people creates a new dynamic in the 
negotiations between Owner One and Owner Two, but that effect is certainly more remote and 
attenuated than if Owner Two were not allowed to continue to rent to a maximum of four 
unrelated people herself. 
74. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
75. MICH.COMP.LAwsANN. § 125.583a(I)(West 1997). 
HeinOnline -- 1998 Det. C.L. Rev. 670 1998
670 Law Review [3:653 
enactment" by continuing to rent to four unrelated individuals-and to be able 
to sell their property with that use and expectation intact-the city's proposed 
plan is of questionable validity under the current statute.76 This uncertainty 
raises the real threat of legal challenges to the plan, and hampers the city's 
plan to improve its neighborhoods. 77 
The first major issue-i.e., whether the original ordinance reducing the 
maximum number of tenants from four to two is constitutional-is more 
settled, and is fully supported under both the V .S. and Michigan Constitutions. 
The V.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in its landmark Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas78 decision in 1974, holding that it is within a city's police 
power to limit the number of unrelated individuals who may live together in 
single-family dwellings. The court upheld such an ordinance promulgated by 
the city of Stony Brook, New York, 79 reasoning that "[ a] quiet place where 
yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate 
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is ... 
permissible .... [The community may] layout zones where family values, 
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area 
a sanctuary for people.,,80 
Regarding the state Constitution, it is true that in 1984 the Michigan 
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Delta Township ordinance 
that limited to two the number of unrelated persons who could occupy a 
single-family dwelling.81 The key point in that case, however, was not the 
mere limitation, but rather that the ordinance did not allow for a so-called 
"functional family" of unrelated individuals to live together under any 
circumstances. That was why the Delta Township ordinance was struck down, 
not simply because it limited the number of unrelated persons from living 
together. Indeed, the court in Dinolfo stated affirmatively that communities 
may "regulate the behavior it finds inimical to its concept of a residential 
neighborhood, including a rational limitation on the numbers of persons that 
may occupy a dwelling.,,82 Moreover, communities "need not open its 
residential borders to transients and others whose lifestyle is notthe functional 
equivalent of 'family' life.,,83 
76. Id. 
77. See infra notes 112 and accompanying text. 
78. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
79. Stony Brook is the home to the State University of New York at Stony Brook. 
80. Vii/age of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. 
81. Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 295, 351 N.W.2d 831, 842 
(1984). 
82. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. at 277,351 N.W.2d at 843. 
83. Id. 
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A recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision bolsters the conclusion that 
such ordinances are valid under the Michigan Constitution. In Stegeman v. 
City of Ann Arbor,84 the court upheld an Ann Arbor ordinance that sought to 
limit the number of unrelated persons from living together, finding that since 
the Ann Arbor zoning code provided for "functional families" (that is, 
unrelated persons living together as a permanent, single housekeeping unit), 
the ordinance was not discriminatory. The court noted that this ordinance 
protected the interests of such "functional families",85 while at the same time 
"acknowledging the right of the municipality to restrict transients and others 
whose lifestyle is not the functional equivalent of a family."s6 
So it is with the ordinance in our hypothetical fact pattern. The 
ordinance is precisely the sort of lawmaking at the local level that the U.S. 
Supreme Court envisions when it speaks of "zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a 
sanctuary for people,,,87 and that the Michigan Supreme Court envisions when 
it speaks of a community's right to preserve "its concept of a residential 
neighborhood, including a rational limitation on the numbers of persons that 
may occupy a dwelling."s8 The important point to be made is that courts at all 
levels agree that municipalities have every right to protect their neighborhoods 
in the way envisioned by this ordinance. 
II. THE MICHIGAN LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND THE ZONING ENABLING 
ACT TO ALLOW THE AMORTIZATION OF NONCONFORMING USES 
A. The Michigan Approach 
As noted previously, amortization, the technique allowed in a majority 
of the states to terminate nonconforming uses,89 is not allowed under the 
Zoning Enabling Act in Michigan. Under the statute, a nonconforming use or 
structure "may be continued ... although that use or structure does not 
conform with the ordinance.,,9Q 
84. 213 Mich. App. 487, 489, 540 N.W.2d 724, 725-26 (1995). 
85. The Ann Arbor provision for "functional families" was what distinguished the case 
from Dinolfo. see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text, the case in which the court struck 
down the Delta Township ordinance. 
86. Stegeman, 213 Mich. App. at 490, 540 N. W.2d at 726. 
87. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. 
88. Dinolfo. 419 Mich. at 256,351 N.W.2d at 832. 
89. See supra notes 10, 27-29 and accompanying text. 
90. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 125.583a(l) (West 1997). See supra note 39 and 
accompanying text. 
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The benchmark case on the topic of amortization in Michigan is the 1962 
case of DeMull v. City of Lowell, 91 in which the Michigan Supreme Court held 
that cities may not amortize nonconforming uses under existing Michigan law. 
The local ordinance at issue in DeMull involved a zoning provision under 
which the plaintiff s preexisting lawfully-operatedjunkyard would be required 
to be discontinued within three years of the effective date of the ordinance.92 
The court concluded that it is beyond a city's authority to sentence 
nonconforming uses to abolition at expiration of a set time period from the 
effective date of ordinance.93 
In striking down the City of Lowell amortization scheme, the DeMull 
court looked to the legislative history ofMCLA § 125 .583a and observed that 
the statute, as originally proposed by the State Senate, actually included 
explicit language allowing amortization, but that the pertinent language was 
ultimately excluded on the basis of a now-obsolete Opinion of the Attorney 
General. The State Senate's proposed amortization language stated: 
"The legislative body in cities and villages may provide for the removal of such 
nonconforming uses or structures by specifying a reasonable period or periods in 
which such removal shall be required. In determining such periods consideration 
shall be given to the type of use and the type, age and other characteristics of the 
structures. ,,94 
The AG Opinion recommended against the inclusion of such language, 
however, concluding that: 
"It is our opinion that Senate Bill No. 74, in delegating to cities and villages the 
power to provide for removal of nonconforming uses by specifying a reasonable 
period based on type of use and the type, age and other characteristics of structures, 
would be held invalid, since it contemplates ordinances which would set definite 
periods oftime."95 
As a result of this AG Opinion, the Zoning Enabling Act as ultimately enacted 
did not contain the proposed amortization language.% 
91. 368 Mich. 242,118 N.W.2d 232 (1962). 
92. See DeMull. 368 Mich. at 247, 118 N.W.2d at 235. 
93. See id. at 250, 118 N.W.2d at 236. 
94. Jd. at 252, 118 N.W.2d at 237 (quoting 1947 Op. Att'y Gen. 146 (1947)(emphasis 
added). 
95. Jd. (quoting 1947 Op. Att'y Gen. 146 (1947). See infra notes 100-09 and 
accompanying text for full discussion of how this Attorney General Opinion has become 
obsolete. 
96. As enacted in 1947, MCLA § 125.583a provided: 
The lawful use of land or a structure exactly as such existed at the time of the 
enactment of the ordinance affecting them, may be continued, except as [otherwise] 
provided in this act, although such use or structure does not conform with the ... 
ordinance .... The legislative body may in its discretion provide by ordinance for the 
HeinOnline -- 1998 Det. C.L. Rev. 673 1998
1998] A Proposal to Amend the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act 673 
In interpreting this legislative history, the DeMull court observed that the 
legislature "has withheld permission to destroy [nonconforming uses], by time 
limitation or otherwise" and accordingly held the city's attempt to amortize 
plaintiff's junkyard under the ordinance "invalid for want of legislative 
warrant. ,,97 
It is time for the Michigan legislature to provide such a "legislative 
warrant"-and to create a clear and uniform Zoning Enabling Act that is well-
adapted to modem needs. The legislature can do so by amending the Act to 
allow the amortization of nonconforming uses. In order to assure that the 
future development and use of its land and resources proceeds in a manner 
that optimizes the needs of both private and community interests, communities 
need the freedom that amortization provides. At the same time, to assure that 
the individual property rights are adequately balanced, any amortization 
scheme undertaken by a city must meet the legal test of reasonableness, 
including the requirement that the property can be put to a reasonable 
"alternate use. ,,98 
The Michigan Supreme Court almost certainly would let stand such an 
amendment.99 First, the court's 1962 DeMull decision (striking down a city's 
amortization ordinance due to lack of legislative authority) was based largely 
upon the legislature's response to a 1947 Attorney General Opinion, the 
substance of which has become clearly obsolete in the intervening fifty years, 
resumption, restoration, reconstruction, extension or substitution of non-conforming 
uses or structures upon such terms and conditions as may be provided in the 
ordinance. In addition to the power granted by this section, cities and villages may 
acquire by purchase, condemnation or otherwise private property for the removal of 
non-conforming uses and structures .... 
Act of June 27, 1947, Public Act of Mich. 1947, No. 272. 
97. DeMul/, 368 Mich. at 252, 118 N.W.2d at 237. Accordingly, Michigan courts 
subsequently have consistently struck down local ordinances that have sought to impose time 
limitations upon the continuation of nonconforming uses. See, e.g., Central Adver. Co. v. City 
of Ann Arbor, 42 Mich. App. 59,74, 201 N.W.2d 365,373 (1972) remanded, 391 Mich. 533, 
218 N. W.2d 27 (1974) (holding that "a city cannot destroy by time limitation 'nonconforming 
lises,' whatever their nature"). 
98. See supra note 19. 
99. Michigan courts have long recognized that a legislature may impose any limitation 
upon the use of property which it deems may be necessary to promote and protect the safety, 
morals, health, comfort and welfare of the people, provided that the limitation has a reasonable 
connection to legislative goals. See, e.g., Square Lake Condominium Ass'n v. Bloomfield 
Township, 437 Mich. 310, 471 N.W.2d 321 (1991); People v. Qualles, 434 Mich. 340, 454 
N.W.2d 374 (1990); Vance v. Ananick, 145 Mich. App. 833, 378 N.W.2d 616 (1985); Horton 
v. Kalamazoo, 81 Mich. App. 78, 264 N. W.2d 128 (1978); Tally v. Detroit, 54 Mich. App. 328, 
220N.W.2d 778 (1974); 1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 20N.W.2d217 
(1945). Michigan courts will defer to the legislative judgment on such matters. See infra note 
123 and accompanying text. 
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and should no longer be considered as persuasive. It is now well-settled that 
amortization of nonconforming uses is within the local police power and is 
hence constitutional under the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of a 
majority of the states. Second, the Michigan Supreme Court has already 
upheld amortization as a land use technique promulgated under the Home 
Rule Act, and has strongly implied that it would uphold the constitutionality 
of amortization under the Zoning Enabling Act as long as the proper 
legislative authority exists. 
B. The Michigan Legislature's Original Basis for Prohibiting Amortization 
No Longer Applies 
On the first point, the Michigan legislature's decision not to include 
amortization language lOO in the 1947 amendments to the Zoning Enabling 
Act-a decision which formed the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court's 
refusal to uphold a city's amortization ordinances in DeMull and subsequent 
cases-was based upon a 1947 Attorney General Opinion which has since 
become obsolete. The AG Opinion acknowledged that earlier Michigan cases 
had established that "the power to zone is not limited to the protection of the 
status quo, but that it may contemplate planning for the future" and that "[t]he 
gradual elimination of non-conforming [sic] uses is within the police 
power,,,IOI but that "[s]uch elimination appears to be limited to change in the 
structures, destruction by fire, abandonment and the like.,,102 The AG Opinion 
goes on to note that it had found only one state court in the entire nation 103 that 
had upheld an ordinance providing for the amortization of nonconforming 
uses and finding that solitary court's theory itself untenable,l04 issued the 
100. As noted supra note 94 and accompanying text, Senate Bill No. 74 included the 
following proposed language: 
The legislative body in cities and villages may provide for the removal of such non-
conforming uses or structures by specifying a reasonable period or periods in which 
removal shall be required. In determining such periods consideration shall be give 
to the type of use and the type, age and other characteristics of the structures. 
DeMull, 368 Mich. at 252,118 NW.2d at 237 (quoting 1947 Op. Att'y Gen. 146 (1947». 
101. 1947-1948 MICH. ATT'yGEN. BIENNIAL REp. at 218 (Mar. 7, 1947)(citing Austin 
v. Older, 283 Mich.667, 675, 278 N.W. 727, 730 (1938». 
102. 1947-1948 MICH. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL REp. (Mar. 7, 1947) (citing Adams v. 
Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 222 N.W. 86, 245 Mich. 261 (1928); Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 
298 Mich. 98 298, N.W. 466 (1941». 
103. The Supreme Court of Louisiana was the only court found by the AG Opinion to 
have upheld an amortization provision. 1947-1948 MICH. ATT'yGEN. BIENNIAL REp. (Mar. 7, 
1947) (citing State ex rei. Duma Realty Co. v. McDonald, 121 So. 613 (1929); State v. Jacoby, 
123 So. 314 (1929». 
104. "[The Louisiana case] was largely based on the theory that after a zoning ordinance 
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opinion that amortization provisions that delegates "to cities and villages the 
power to provide for removal of non-conforming [sic] uses by specifying a 
reasonable period [for elimination] ... would be ... invalid, since it 
contemplates ordinances which would set definite periods oftime."lOs 
Was the 1947 AG Opinion warranted in its conclusion? The benefit of 
fifty years time allows us to answer the question with an emphatic "No." 
First, the AG's objection to the proffered legislation was based largely 
upon the fact that in 1947 there were no cases in other states (save Louisiana, 
with whose theory the AG Opinion disagreed) upholding similar amortization 
schemes. That clearly is no longer the case-indeed, in the last fifty years 
courts in a majority of the states have upheld amortization provisions of the 
sort at issue in the 1947 Michigan AG Opinion. 106 The natural conclusion to 
be drawn is that had the amortization approach been as widely accepted in 
1947 as it is today, the Opinion of the Attorney General would have been 
different, and the proposed language allowing amortization probably would 
have remained in the statute. 
Second, the AG Opinion itself suggests that its objection to amortization 
in 1947 was quite thin to begin with. Specifically, the 1947 AG Opinion 
qualified its negative opinion with the following statement: "If a period were 
provided based on the normal life of uses or structures; for example, one based 
on the length of time in which the value of a structure would, in good 
accounting practice, be written off, our opinion would be otherwise. ,,107 In 
other words, the AG Opinion was willing to go beyond what it determined was 
the prevailing practice of the day by allowing the reasoned elimination of 
nonconforming uses. 
Based on these comments, it is clear that the Attorney General's Opinion 
was based not on any particular philosophical objections to the concept of 
is effective, a non-conforming use becomes a nuisance and can be abated." 1947-1948 MICH. 
Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REp. (Mar. 7,1947). The AG Opinion also noted that "Massachusetts 
enacted in 1941 a special act for Boston providing for the liquidation of non-conforming uses 
by 1961," but that the AG could find no Massachusetts decisions on that special act. Id. 
105. 1947-1948 MICH. Arr'yGEN. BIENNIAL REp. (Mar. 7,1947). The exact language 
of the AG Opinion reads as follows: 
It is our opinion that Senate Bill No. 74, in delegating to cities and villages the power 
to provide for removal of non-conforming uses by specifying a reasonable period 
based on type of use and the type, age and other characteristics of structures, would 
be held invalid, since it contemplates ordinances which would set definite periods of 
time. 
ld. To better understand the Attorney General's position, see supra note 23 and accompanying 
text for description of how nonconforming uses were viewed in the early days of zoning. 
106. See supra notes 24, 35 and accompanying text. 
107. 1947-1948 MICH. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REp. (Mar. 7, 1947) (emphasis added). 
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amortizing nonconforming uses or structures; rather, the Opinion's "normal 
life write-off' phrase108 suggests that the AG's objection is simply with the 
means by which the city would determine the length of time before 
termination of the nonconforming use or structure would occur. Ifthat detail 
were to be reconciled by the legislature, the Opinion suggests, the AG would 
favor the scheduled removal of nonconforming uses and structures-even in 
1947, without the benefit of knowing that courts in a majority of states would 
later explicitly uphold even broader amortization provisions. 109 
Third, a subsequent 1978 amendment to MCLA § 125.583a further 
suggests that the Michigan legislature is ready to revisit the matter of 
amortization. The statute was amended in 1978 to split section 3a into three 
subparts, and in so doing the Michigan legislature added the following second 
sentence to what became section 3a(2): "[i]n establishing terms for the 
resumption, restoration, reconstruction, extension, or substitution of 
nonconform ing uses or structures, different classes of nonconform ing use may 
be established in the ordinance with different regulations applicable to each 
class."llo In the words of the House Legislative Analysis Section, the 
amendment was intended to update the Zoning Enabling Act by permitting 
cities "to establish different classes of nonconforming uses, with different 
regulations for each.,,111 This and other amendments to the Zoning Enabling 
Act were intended to perm it better land management and "to ensure that uses 
108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
109. This qualification in the AG Opinion is interesting from the standpoint that the 
legislature did not then redraft the offending phrase to comply with the AG Opinion; rather, the 
legislature simply dropped the phrase altogether. It would have been a simple revision for the 
legislature to replace the offending phrase, see supra text accompanying notes 94, 95, with 
language that complied with the AG Opinion's suggestion. One can only speculate as to the 
reason for the legislature's failure to adopt such a reworked phrase-the legislative history is 
unrevealing on this point. Perhaps the legislature believed that a requirement specifying that 
removal be tied to "normal life" would be in some way unworkable for cities to implement. 
110. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 125.583a § 3a(2) (West 1997). After the 1978 
amendments, the statute assumed its current language. See supra note 39 and accompanying 
text. 
III. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, SECOND ANALYSIS, H.B.s 4591-4594 at 
I (Mich. 1971). According to the analysis, "Michigan's zoning enabling acts are severely 
outdated and are, in many places, vague or confusing. Changing trends in the planning and use 
of land, new types of building developments, and a greater concern for the environment have 
rendered these statutes unwieldy and inadequate tools." /d. 
These legislative proposals were the outcome of a ten-month study of Michigan's zoning 
enabling acts undertaken by an advisory committee under the sponsorship of the Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources. See id. at 2. 
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of land take place in appropriate locations and relationships, and to encourage 
the use ofland in a socially and economically desirable manner.,,112 
With these 1978 changes, the legislature sent the explicit message that 
it recognizes its responsibility "to take the initiative and provide local units 
with clear and uniform laws adapted to modern needs,,,"3 and that it intended 
to delegate to cities even broader police power authority to promulgate and 
enforce its zoning rules, including nonconforming uses, since local 
government is best positioned to know what is appropriate for the area: 
The general effect of these bills will be to give local units of government greater 
control of land management. This is both reasonable, in that local units should be 
best informed about environmental and commercial conditions in the area, and fair, 
in that it is the local officials and their immediate constituencies who will have to live 
with the decisions that are made. "J 
The legislature's 1978 amendments were an important and necessary first 
step to providing local government with "laws adapted to modern needs," but 
for the same reasons elucidated in the House Legislative Analysis Section 
Report I 15 the legislature now needs to go one step further to amend the Zoning 
Enabling Act to explicitly allow amortization of nonconforming uses-as it had 
desired to do from the beginning, only to be dissuaded by the now-obsolete 
1947 Opinion of the Attorney General. Cities naturally are in the best position 
to know about local conditions in the area, and cities need to have the added 
flexibility of being able to amortize nonconforming uses. As demonstrated 
herein, the majority of states already allow cities this flexibility; it is now time 
for the Michigan legislature to provide an explicit statement, by means of an 
amendment to MCLA 125.583a, that adapts the Zoning Enabling Act to 
modern needs by granting cities the power to pass ordinances providing for 
the amortization of nonconforming uses and structures. 116 
112. ld. at I. 
1l3. ld. at 3. The analysis came to this conclusion based upon the "enormous volume 
oflitigation" that had ensued from the Zoning Enabling Act. "Zoning law has lately been made 
more in the courts that in the legislature. This unsystematic process has resulted in a 
hodgepodge of decisions that has increased the over-all confusion." ld. 
114. ld. at3. 
115. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
116. For specific language of the proposed amendment, this article recommends that the 
legislature adopt the exact language proposed in, and then redacted from, the original 1947 act. 
After amendment, MCLA 125.583a § 3a(l) would read as follows (language to be added in 
italics): 
The lawful use ofland or a structure exactly as the land or structure existed at the time 
of the enactment of the ordinance affecting that land or structure, may be continued, 
except as otherwise provided in this act, although that use or structure does not 
conform with the ordinance. The legislative body in cities and villages may provide 
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C. The Michigan Supreme Court Has Upheld the Principle of Amortization 
in Other Contexts 
A second reason suggesting that the Michigan Supreme Court would 
almost certainly let stand such an amendment is the court itself made clear in 
a 1992 case that it is willing in principle to allow amortization of 
nonconforming uses and structures, so long as proper legislative authority 
exists. In Adams Outdoor Advertising v. East Lansingl17 the court drew a 
distinction between the Home Rule Act, 118 which does not contain any explicit 
limitations against amortization, and the Zoning Enabling Act, which, as we 
have seen, does not allow amortization. Determining that East Lansing's 
regulation allowing the amortization of nonconforming signs was promulgated 
pursuant to the Home Rule Act instead of the Zoning Enabling Act, the court 
upheld the city's ordinance. 119 
Adams Outdoor Advertising is important because it demonstrates for the 
first time that the Michigan Supreme Court is willing to allow amortization 
when there exists the proper legislative authority. In so holding the court 
sends the message that it considers local amortization schemes, in principal, 
to be constitutional exercises of the city's police power. 
Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court has strongly implied that it 
would approve of the use of amortization under the Zoning Enabling Act. In 
DeMull, despite striking down the amortization ordinance "for want of 
legislative warrant,,,120 the Michigan Supreme Court as much as invited the 
legislature to adopt language allowing amortization under the Zoning Enabling 
Act: "[T]he cities of Michigan have not as yet been authorized, by requisite 
legislative act, to terminate nonconforming uses by ordinance of time 
limitation.,,121 Further, "[sJo far the legislature has permitted ordinances 
providing for the resumption, restoration, reconstruction, extension or 
substitution of nonconforming uses.,,122 
for the removal of such nonconforming uses or structures by specifying a reasonable 
period or periods in which such removal shall be required. In determining such 
periods consideration shall be given to the type of use and the type, age and other 
characteristics of the structures. 
117. 439 Mich. 209, 483 N.W.2d 38 (1992). 
118. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § I 17.4i(5) (West 1991). See supra note 64 for 
description of the Home Rule Act. 
119. See Adams Outdoor Adver., 439 Mich. at 218, 483 N.W.2d at 42. 
120. DeMull V. City of Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, 252, 118 N.W.2d 232, 237 (1962). See 
supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
121. DeMull, 368 Mich. at 250,118 N.W.2d at 237 (emphasis added). 
122. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Implied in the Michigan Supreme Court's comments in DeMull is the 
notion that the only thing preventing cities from being allowed to amortize 
nonconforming uses and structures is the legislature's decision not to allow 
it, and that if the legislature were at some point to decide affirmatively to 
allow amortization under the Zoning Enabling Act, the court would defer to 
that judgment as well. 123 To uphold legislatively-enacted amortization 
schemes would be in keeping with other pronouncements from the Michigan 
Supreme Court suggesting that while "[a]n ordinance requiring an immediate 
cessation ofa nonconforming use may be held to be unconstitutional because 
it brings about a deprivation of property rights out of proportion to the public 
benefit obtained," the gradual elimination of nonconforming business in 
existence at the time of passage of a zoning ordinance is within a city's police 
power. 124 
123. Such deference is required under the Michigan and U.S. Constitutions. Under the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, it is not up to the court to make legislative 
policy-such decisions are properly left to the legislature. Michigan's Constitution provides: 
The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and 
judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly 
belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution. 
MICH. CONST. Art. 3, §2. In the context of the judiciary's review oflegislation, this provision 
is applied such that Michigan courts hold as a cardinal rule of statutory construction the need 
to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. See. e.g .. Melia v. Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273, 282 (1956). 
As articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court, "[o]ur laws have wisely committed to the 
people of a community themselves the determination of their municipal destiny .... The people 
of the community, through their appropriate legislative body, and not the courts, govern its 
growth and its life." Brae Bum, Inc. v. Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 431,86 N. W.2d 166, 
169 (1957). The court added, 
With the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the [legislature's] determination we are not 
concerned .... Let us state the proposition as clearly as may be: It is not our function 
to approve [legislation] ... as to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses involving 
such factors, the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts. We do not substitute our 
judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the duty and responsibility in 
the premises. 
Brae Burn, 350 Mich. at 431,86 N.W.2d at 169. 
The U.S. Supreme Court laid out its position on the matter of judicial deference to 
legislative zoning action in Euclid. stating that "[i]fthe validity of the legislative classification 
for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926). A court may strike down 
the legislature's action as unconstitutional only when such action is shown to be "clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare." Id. at 395. See also Queenside Hills Realty v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946) 
(suggesting that choices involving social policy are best left to the legislature-choices that 
should not be lightly discarded by the courts). 
124. Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 676, 278 N. W. 727, 730 (1938) (emphasis added). 
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In sum, in light of the Michigan Court's comments regarding 
amortization, 125 its interpretations of the state and federal Constitutions, 126 and 
its pronouncements regarding judicial deference,127 it is highly likely that the 
Michigan Supreme Court would uphold an amendmentto the Zoning Enabling 
Act to allow amortization of nonconforming uses. This would be a positive 
development in Michigan law, for to hold otherwise would unnecessarily and 
improperly restrict the broad police power conferred on local governments by 
the state legislature, by preventing the enactment and operation of a 
reasonable and flexible means of eliminating nonconforming uses in the 
public interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The Michigan legislature should amend the Zoning Enabling Act to allow 
amortization of nonconforming uses. This Article has argued that while 
Michigan cities already have broad discretion under existing law to eliminate 
or exclude nonconforming uses under certain circumstances, cities need to 
have the technique of amortization at their disposal in order to be able to 
effectively carry out their comprehensive plans for growth and development. 
At the same time, the thoughtful consideration of private property rights must 
always be included in the mix, so any local amortization plan must satisfy the 
legal test of reasonableness and allow for reasonable alternate uses of the 
affected property. By amending the Zoning Enabling Act to allow 
amortization of nonconforming uses, the Michigan Legislature will provide 
local government with laws adapted to modern needs, and in so doing it will 
join the majority of states and the great weight of authority that now recognize 
amortization as a viable and effective land-use planning technique. 
See also Gackler v. Yankee Springs Township, 427 Mich 562, 398 N.W.2d 393 (1986) 
(commenting that in the interest of public safety and aesthetics, a local community may under 
its police power properly provide for the limitation and eventual elimination of a nonconforming 
use); Norton Shores v. Carr, 265 Mich. App. 715; 265 N.W.2d 802 (1978); South Central Imp. 
Ass'n v. City of St. Clair Shores, 348 Mich. 153; 82 N. W.2d 453 (1957) (noting that zoning 
ordinance's limitation of nonconforming uses contemplates the elimination of the 
nonconforming use); Redford Moving & Storage Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 Mich. 163; 58 
N.W.2d 812 (1953) (stating that continuation of nonconforming use under zoning ordinance is 
for the purpose of avoiding imposition of hardship upon the owner of property with a view to 
gradual elimination of the nonconforming use); Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 298 Mich. 98; 298 
N.W. 466 (1949) (same). See also supra notes 57, 58 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra note 123-24. 
127. See id. 
